By Tahani Ali
After years of stalled attempts to return the Rohingya to Myanmar, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim announced in late July that Myanmar had agreed to receive 5,000 Rohingya refugees from Malaysia, while indicating that around 300,000 people could also be returned from Bangladesh. The announcement included neither a timetable nor detailed implementation mechanisms.
The announcement came amid growing domestic pressure over the presence of refugees and as Malaysia asked the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to temporarily suspend the registration of new refugees while it works on a national registration system.
Days later, however, the Malaysian government said it would not proceed with the return of the 5,000 if it was determined that their lives would be at risk, while screening and vetting processes continued.
Myanmar’s position then added further uncertainty to the process. The government said it had verified the data of 426,545 people from a Bangladesh list containing 828,824 refugees and considered 308,797 of them to be former residents of Arakan State. It said it was ready to receive those whose data had been verified once security conditions improved.
By contrast, a Myanmar Foreign Ministry official told the Associated Press that the return programme from Malaysia focused exclusively on verified Myanmar nationals being held in centres in Malaysia, rejecting reports that the government had agreed to receive the Rohingya.
Abdullah Zainul, an analyst specialising in Rohingya affairs at Istanbul-based Legal Action Worldwide, believes domestic pressure may be part of the backdrop to Malaysia’s move, but says Kuala Lumpur “will proceed cautiously” with any return that could expose the Rohingya to further violations.
He says Myanmar’s central authorities “do not have effective control” over large parts of Arakan State, raising a fundamental question: Who will guarantee the safety of returnees?
A Long Record of Return Attempts
This is not the first time that “return” has become a diplomatic objective.
In the 1990s, a large-scale process to return Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh began, and UNHCR launched operations to assist voluntary return in 1994.
By mid-1997, around 230,000 refugees had returned to Myanmar.
But return did not end the causes of displacement. Rohingya continued to leave Myanmar in the years that followed, including thousands who returned to Bangladesh.
Following the major wave of displacement in 2017, Bangladesh and Myanmar signed agreements on the return of refugees, while UNHCR signed a memorandum of understanding with Bangladesh in 2018 to establish a framework for voluntary, safe and dignified return when conditions became conducive.
UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also agreed with Myanmar to work toward creating conditions for return, including a pathway to citizenship and freedom of movement.
UNHCR, however, stressed that conditions in Arakan State were not conducive to sustainable return.
In 2023, another attempt under a pilot project targeting around 1,100 refugees stalled after many Rohingya refused to return without guarantees of security, rights and citizenship.
Return Is More Than Crossing a Border
UNHCR stresses that return must be voluntary, safe and dignified, and that refugees must make their decisions freely and on the basis of reliable information about conditions in their country and area of return.
It also stresses that sustainable return requires an environment in which returnees can live in safety and dignity.
Varun Kar Thway, a UNHCR field assistant in Myanmar, says that, “to his knowledge, UNHCR has not received clear information about concrete preparations for the Malaysian return process.”
He stressed that security, legal status, citizenship and protection from discrimination and persecution must be at the forefront of any process.
Matthew Smith, Chief Executive Officer and founder of the rights organisation Fortify Rights, adds a legal dimension to the debate, saying Malaysia “is bound by the principle of non-refoulement,” which prohibits returning people to places where they may face persecution.
He argues that any credible return process must put the Rohingya themselves at the centre of the decision and that their consent should not be considered voluntary if they face detention, deportation or any form of coercion.
Smith stresses that return must allow the Rohingya to “restore their lives in their places of origin,” including through the restitution of homes, land and property or compensation for them, and must be accompanied by meaningful guarantees of protection and accountability for past violations.
That position is echoed by a Rohingya student and young activist in Malaysia who asked not to be identified. He argues that any return must guarantee “citizenship, equality, freedom of movement, education and healthcare,” alongside “independent international monitoring.”
Where Will the Rohingya Return To?
This may be the most complex issue. Arakan State, home to most of Myanmar’s Rohingya, continues to see conflict between the Myanmar military and the Buddhist Arakan Army (AA).
UN estimates indicate that around 630,000 Rohingya are in the state, facing security risks, restrictions and violations in conflict areas.
The United Nations has said that the humanitarian situation and displacement in Myanmar continue to deteriorate, while UNHCR data indicate that around 1.2 million refugees from Myanmar, most of them Rohingya, are in Bangladesh.
Nay San Lwin, a Rohingya activist based in Germany and co-founder of the Free Rohingya Coalition, says it remains unclear where refugees could be returned and that “return appears practically impossible while fighting continues and there is no single authority capable of guaranteeing their safety.”
He argues that any genuine return requires enabling the Rohingya to return to their places of origin, granting them full citizenship and recognition of their identity, and providing guarantees against the recurrence of violations.
For this reason, the success of any new agreement should not be measured by the number of people who cross the border, but by their ability to remain in Myanmar without being forced to flee again.
After decades of return attempts, the fundamental problem appears unchanged: agreements can establish a mechanism for return, but they cannot by themselves create security, citizenship or rights.
Return does not begin at the border, but when the conditions that made return impossible in previous attempts have changed.
